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Abstract: In Unsettled Thoughts, Julia Staffel argues that non-ideal thinkers should seek to 
approximate ideal Bayesian rationality. She argues that the more rational you are, the more benefits 
of rationality you will enjoy. After summarizing Staffel’s main results, this paper looks more closely 
at two issues that arise later in the book: the relationship between Bayesian rationality and other 
kinds of rationality, and the role that outright belief plays in addition to credence. Ultimately, I 
argue that there are several roles that outright belief might play, and I explore different ways that 
these roles for belief might fit together. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Uncertainty is a fact of life. We often form attitudes and make decisions from a position of 
uncertainty. Epistemologists capture this by appealing to credences, a measurement of our 
(un)certainty in propositions. On the standard way of modeling credences, 1 represents maximal 
certainty a proposition is true, and 0 represents certainty it is false. For example, while my credence 
in modus ponens is close to 1, my credence that a fair coin will lands heads is 0.5, and my credence 
that it will snow in Tampa tomorrow is quite low.  
 
While descriptive questions about credence are significant and interesting (see Eriksson and Hájek 
2007), epistemologists have primarily focused on normative questions about credence: what makes 
a credence rational? According to an influential theory, Bayesianism, a credence function is rational 
only if it obeys two constraints: it is probabilistically coherent and updated by conditionalization.  
 
While at first blush, these Bayesian requirements on credences seem plausible, problems arise when 
they are applied to actual human thinkers. There’s quite a bit of evidence from cognitive science 
that we are not rational Bayesian thinkers. Humans frequently make probabilistic errors, such as 
the base rate fallacy. And not only do we fail to meet the Bayesian requirements; these requirements 
seem implausibly strong. Consider: an agent with probabilistically coherent credences will assign 
credence 1 to all logical truths. But when it comes to an unproven mathematical theorem, most 
human thinkers will (understandably) assign that a credence of 0.5. Is this really irrational?  
 
Bayesians respond that their theory of rational credence is a theory of ideal rationality, and it may 
not straightforwardly apply to actual human thinkers. But then the obvious question is: what is it 
for an actual human thinker to have rational credences? This is one of the significant and 
underexplored questions that Julia Staffel addresses in Unsettled Thoughts: A Theory of Degrees of 
Rationality.  
 
More specifically, Staffel seeks to defend and precisify two main claims about Bayesian rationality. 
The first is that rationality comes in degrees, so one can be more or less rational. The second is 
that non-ideal thinkers should seek to approximate ideal rationality. To illustrate this, Staffel 
provides a helpful distinction between two kinds of goods: a winner-take-all good, like a dream 
job (there aren't benefits to being the number-two candidate), and goods for which the closer you 
are to the ideal, the more benefits you glean, such as learning a language. The idea is that Bayesian 
rationality is not a winner-take-all case. Instead, the more rational you are, the more of the benefits 
of rationality you enjoy (p. 4-5). 
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My goal in this critical notice is to summarize some of Staffel’s main claims and arguments, and 
then comment further on some of the arguments in later chapters, specifically chapters 8 and 9. 
In Section 2, I provide an overall summary of the book, and some general comments and 
observations. In Section 3, I explain and raise some questions about chapter 8, a chapter on 
different types of rationality. In Section 4, I explain and discuss the arguments from chapter 9, a 
chapter on the role that belief plays for non-ideal thinkers. I conclude in Section 5. 
 
2. Summary and Preliminary Remarks 
 
I’ll begin with an overview of the book. After introducing and explaining the aims of the book in 
chapter 1, chapter 2 provides an overview of Bayesian rationality. Staffel discusses probabilism 
and conditionalization, and other Bayesian norms such as the Principle Principle (one's knowledge 
of objective chances should constrain their credences), Indifference Principles (one should 
distribute their credence equally among symmetrical options), and Reflection Principles (one 
should defer to expert credences, including one’s own future credences). Staffel mentions other 
normative concepts like the uniqueness principle, higher-order evidence, Jeffrey 
conditionalization, and more. The summary of these norms is very helpful, and I highly 
recommend chapter 2 for anyone interested in an overview of the Bayesian project.  
 
Chapter 2 closes by explaining a crucial missing piece of the Bayesian framework: how does 
Bayesian rationality apply to non-ideal thinkers? Chapter 3 begins to answer this question by 
focusing on a central tenant of Bayesian: coherence. Staffel considers several ways we might 
approximate coherence, and argues (in my view, convincingly) that we should prefer quantitative 
measures of coherence approximation to qualitative measures. She discusses four quantitative 
distance measures we might use: absolute distance, Euclidean distance, Chebyshev distance, and 
Kullback-Leibler divergence.  
 
Staffel then turns to the question: why is it good to be coherent? The basic answer is that the more 
coherent one’s credences are, the better they can perform their function. Staffel focuses on two 
functions of credence: guiding action and representing the world. In chapter 4, Staffel argues that 
reducing credal incoherence leads to less Dutch-book-ability, meaning that more coherent 
credences will better guide action because they lead to fewer losses from Dutch books. In chapter 
5, Staffel argues that there are certain ways of becoming coherent that guarantee improvements in 
accuracy. Thus, at least in these cases, more coherent credences better perform the function of 
representing the world than less coherent ones.  
 
Chapter 6 turns to how we might approximate ideal rationality if thinkers are required to comply 
with norms in addition to coherence. Staffel discusses two main strategies: the bundle strategy, on 
which we take the principles of rationality together to determine the permissible credences, and 
measure incoherence as the distance from the nearest permissible credence function, and the 
piecemeal strategy, on which we measure the approximation to each rational norm separately, and 
then aggregate the results. Staffel discusses how these strategies fit with the view that there is a 
single epistemic good (e.g. accuracy) or multiple epistemic goods (e.g. accuracy, evidential fit, etc.). 
While this chapter doesn’t commit to a single strategy or single view of epistemic goodness, Staffel 
ultimately suggests that the bundle strategy has significant advantages over the piecemeal strategy.  
 
Chapter 7 considers thinkers who reason from irrational starting points. It considers three types 
of credal changes: changes without learning new information or adding new attitudes, changes 
without learning new information that involve adding new attitudes, and changes as a response to 
new evidence. Chapters 8 and 9 apply the previous results to other theories of rationality and the 
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role of outright beliefs, respectively. We’ll discuss these chapters in more detail in the next two 
sections.  
 
Overall, there is much to be said in praise of this book—there isn’t much more you can ask from 
a monograph. It is clear, well-written, and tightly argued; each chapter has a distinct thesis and a 
concise but informative overview of each section. Not only this, but this book is timely and needed; 
while Bayesian epistemology is popular and important, little work has been done on whether and 
how human thinkers should approximate Bayesian rationality. While, at points, the reader might 
feel like the book could be more committal, as much time is spent laying out various options (e.g. 
chapters 3 and 6), I actually think this is appropriate, given the state of the debate—this book is 
about a vital but underexplored area of epistemic rationality, and much of logical space hasn’t been 
explored yet. 
 
One of the things I most appreciate about the book is Staffel’s use of formalism. Bayesian 
epistemology can be quite technical. While formal tools are extremely helpful and a key element 
of philosophical progress, they can also be overused, making simple concepts completely 
inaccessible, especially to those unfamiliar with the relevant formalisms. Staffel does an excellent 
job using formalism without being overly technical. Thus, I recommend Staffel’s book to a wide 
audience, including traditional (or, as my friend calls them, “casual”) epistemologists. 
 
I also enjoyed that this book touched on the permissivism/uniqueness debate in several chapters 
(e.g. chapters 6 and 7). Permissivism is the view that there are evidential situations that rationally 
permit more than one attitude toward a proposition. The relationship between permissivism and 
Bayesianism is interesting for several reasons. First, traditional Bayesianism implies an 
interpersonally permissive view of rationality (see Meacham 2014); this is notable because 
permissivism has the reputation of setting a “low bar” for rationality. However, Bayesian rationality 
is idealized rationality. The lesson is that there are many ways to be a permissivist, and not all set 
a low bar for rationality.  
 
I also found Staffel’s discussion of the relationship between permissivism and conditionalization 
noteworthy (ch. 7, sec. 2), as it bears on the question of whether Bayesian is consistent with 
intrapersonal credal permissivism (permissivism involving a single agent’s credences). The traditional 
interpretation of conditionalization is that thinkers should adjust their credences when and only when 
they get new evidence. This raises the question: does conditionalization rule out intrapersonal 
permissivism? Not necessarily; two possibilities are worth exploring. First, the intrapersonal 
permissivist could accept that there may be more than one way to rationally change one’s credences 
in response to new evidence, depending on how one interprets or weighs the new evidence. 
Second, one could weaken conditionalization to the view that thinkers should adjust their 
credences when they get new evidence, but rational thinkers can sometimes adjust their credences 
in response to non-evidential changes (such as practical reasons, a change in stakes, a change in 
what hypotheses one is considering, etc.). Generally, the prospects for credal intrapersonal 
permissivism merit further exploration—including the relationship between these credal changes 
and susceptibility to Dutch books. 
 
3. Varieties of Rationality 
 
Now, we’ll more closely examine two later chapters. This section focuses on chapter 8, and the 
next focuses on chapter 9. In chapter 8, Staffel discusses varieties of rationality, focusing on five 
distinctions. Here, we’ll focus mainly on the relationship between propositional and doxastic 
rationality and the relationship between evaluative and ameliorative approaches to rationality.  
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An attitude is propositionally rational iff it is rational to hold it; an attitude is doxastically rational 
iff it is rationally held. Staffel uses this distinction to shed light on two cases. In case 1, a logic 
student considers an unknown tautology and forms a 0.5 credence in it. In case 2, a logic student 
considers an unknown tautology and forms a credence of 1 in it. This illustrates the problem of 
logical omniscience: according to Bayesian norms, you ought to have a credence of 1 in all 
tautologies, but this seems to require logical omniscience. And many will judge that the student 
with credence 0.5 is rational, and the student with credence 1 is irrational.  
 
Staffel suggests that a potential solution to this problem involves the distinction between 
propositional and doxastic rationality. If we interpret the claim that it’s rational to have a credence 
of 1 in tautologies as a claim about propositional rationality, then we can maintain that the student 
with credence 1 is propositionally, but not doxastically, rational. By contrast, the student with 
credence 0.5 is doxastically, but not propositionally, rational. They are both rational in some sense 
(p. 154-5).  
 
While Staffel’s solution is attractive, it also has several noteworthy—and, for some, potentially 
unattractive—consequences. First, as Staffel notes (p. 155) it’s standardly thought that doxastic 
rationality entails propositional rationality. However, on this view, doxastic and propositional 
rationality crosscut each other.  
 
Second, for this solution to help with the general problem of logical omniscience, it requires that 
each thinker’s evidence supports every tautology to degree 1. And this seems to presuppose a 
particular view of evidential support. There are two general camps regarding evidential support: 
psychological and non-psychological views. On the psychological views, whether one’s body of 
evidence supports a certain proposition p depends heavily on certain psychological facts, e.g., 
whether one sees that their evidence supports p, whether one could derive p from their evidence, 
etc. On the non-psychological views, there’s an objective evidential support relation that does not 
depend on a thinker’s psychology.  
 
To establish the claim that each thinker’s evidence supports every tautology to degree 1, one must 
accept a view of evidential support that is fully non-psychological. On this view, the credences that 
are propositionally rational for you could be completely beyond your ken—things you could never 
reason to or figure out, even given unlimited time and resources. Of course, these camps form a 
continuum, and the fully psychological notions of evidential support might be problematic too—
plausibly, there are cases where one isn’t directly aware of what their evidence supports. But the 
fully objective notion of evidential support seems to take things too far in the other direction, as 
it may be impossible for a thinker to determine what attitudes are propositionally rational for them. 
Thus, while I agree with Staffel that Bayesians should pay more attention to the distinction 
between propositional and doxastic rationality, the right view of evidential support may fall 
somewhere in between the extreme psychological view and the extreme non-psychological view. 
Therefore, in general, it’s not clear to me that each thinker’s evidence supports every tautology to 
degree 1.  
 
Second, I want to address some of Staffel’s remarks regarding the relationship between evaluative 
and ameliorative approaches to rationality. Evaluative approaches to rationality evaluate thinkers 
from a third-person point of view and don't purport to tell them how to be more rational. 
Ameliorative approaches take the first-person point of view and seek to guide thinkers toward 
rationality. Staffel is clear that she’s only interested in the former: “The theory of degrees of 
rationality I propose is an evaluative theory…[it cannot] answer questions about how particular 
irrational thinkers should reason or change their credences” (p. 160). She also remarks, “There is 
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thus no direct path from an evaluative theory of epistemic rationality to a theory that tells us how 
particular thinker should change their credences in particular situations” (p. 161).  
 
While of course evaluative rationality is important in its own right, I was a bit disappointed that 
Staffel took her conclusions to have no implications for how a thinker should change their 
credences from the first-person point of view. Given that one of the goals of the book was to 
provide an account of rationality for non-ideal thinkers, it would be nice for these thinkers to be 
able to utilize this account to inform their reasoning and attitude formation. 
 
Further, Staffel suggests that ameliorative questions about rationality are largely empirical, since 
they concern psychological questions about how people in fact reason and even pedagogical 
questions about how good reasoning should be taught (p. 162). However, the question of what 
action-guiding norm applies given one’s attitudes and situation seems different from the much 
more practical and empirical question of how we should teach and or motivate people to be 
rational. Consider moral philosophy. Much of normative and applied ethics is about determining 
the true action-guiding norms, but what ethicists are doing seems separable from practical 
questions about how we might, say, effectively teach children about morality in a classroom setting. 
Thus, it seems possible to engage in a philosophical study of action-guiding norms (in both 
epistemology and ethics) that doesn’t primarily involve empirical psychology. An application of 
Staffel’s evaluative theory to ameliorative rationality strikes me, then, as a promising area of further 
philosophical research.  
 
4. Roles for Belief 
 
Chapter 9 turns from credence to the role and rationality of outright belief. The chapter presents 
a puzzle about outright belief, then argues for a particular solution. Staffel assumes that humans 
have outright beliefs in addition to credences. She argues that this is because beliefs simplify 
reasoning by ruling out small error possibilities. In some contexts, it’s appropriate to treat a claim 
in which one has a high credence as true, as this makes one’s reasoning process much easier. 
Furthermore, ruling out a small error possibility doesn’t result in a substantial loss of accuracy (see 
Ross and Schroeder 2014, Tang 2015, Jackson 2019).  
 
On this picture, it’s natural to think that whether we rely on our belief that p or our credence in p 
can vary with context. In some contexts (e.g. low stakes), we treat a claim as true, while in others 
(e.g. high stakes), we treat it as probable but uncertain. A strategy that has been proposed for how 
we might manage beliefs and credences across contexts is called pseudo-conditionalization. When 
a thinker uses pseudo-conditionalization, they conditionalize on p, but not because they learn p 
with certainty, but because the context allows them to treat p as true. However, pseudo-
conditionalization is very computationally demanding. If the role of outright belief is to simplify 
reasoning, it’s implausible that managing outright beliefs would require such a complex strategy. 
Pseudo-conditionalization, then, seems to undermine belief’s primary functional role. 
 
Staffel summarizes the puzzle by noting that the following four claims are all plausible, but we 
need to reject one (p. 176):  
 
(1) Human thinkers have outright beliefs in addition to credences because outright 
beliefs help simplify reasoning processes.  
(2) Reasoning processes can involve mixtures of credences and outright beliefs, 
and it is flexible from context to context which outright beliefs are relied upon.  
(3) Outright beliefs and credences in a context are determined by pseudo-
conditionalizing on a set of background credences.  
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(4) Pseudo-conditionalizing is difficult to execute for human reasoners, because it 
is computationally expensive. 
 
Ultimately, Staffel suggests we reject claim 3. Claim 3 undermines belief’s functional role of 
simplifying reasoning. Staffel importantly points out that, when trying to determine the norms 
governing a mental state, we must consider that state’s function role (p. 188). So if the functional 
role of belief is to simplify reasoning, then the norms for belief should complement that role—we 
shouldn’t posit super computationally demanding norms for belief. (In contrast, the norms for 
credence can be quite demanding, since the functional role of credence is not simplification, but 
accuracy.) Instead of pseudo-conditionalizing, Staffel suggests we use a simpler strategy for 
managing beliefs and credences. When we rely on our belief that p, we treat p as if it had probability 
1 in that context. However, we needn’t adjust our credences in all other claims accordingly, as 
pseudo-conditionalizing requires. This can lead to incoherence—both within a context and across 
contexts. Nonetheless, the incoherence is only slight (p. 190ff). 
 
I want to explore the possibility of denying another claim in the puzzle—claim 1. Staffel motivates 
claim 1 by objecting to two other roles that belief might play; I’ll argue her objections aren’t 
ultimately compelling. Then, I’ll explain my main worry for the claim that the only role for belief 
is that of simplifying reasoning. Finally, I’ll suggest some other roles for belief that vindicate 
Staffel’s assumption that we have both beliefs and credences. 
 
Staffel motivates claim 1 by considering views on which the main function of belief is something 
other than simplifying reasoning. She considers two alternative functions. The first is that outright 
beliefs are necessary as a basis for moral judgment; the second is that outright beliefs are necessary 
for knowledge. We’ll take them in reverse order, and I’ll argue that Staffel’s reasons for rejecting 
each alternative are not decisive.  
 
Consider the idea that outright beliefs play a role in knowledge. It’s widely thought that knowing 
p requires believing p. Then, if knowledge is valuable, outright belief is valuable, too. Staffel rejects 
this role for belief based on the way she defines beliefs and credences. She defines a credence as 
an attitude that encodes uncertainty, and a belief as an attitude that does not encode uncertainty 
(p. 184). Given this, credences can constitute knowledge because probability-beliefs are credences. 
There are two problems with this, however. The first is that this is a non-standard way of 
understanding beliefs and credences. While, when it comes to the simplifying role of belief, it does 
seem like probability-beliefs and credences function similarly (neither rules out the possibility of 
not-p). At the same time, most think that probability-beliefs and credences are distinct, except 
those that think credences reduce to probability-beliefs (see Moon and Jackson 2020) but Staffel 
explicitly assumes that belief and credence are irreducible. Then, it’s plausible that probability-
beliefs are beliefs, not credences. Second, even if we accept Staffel’s non-standard way of 
understanding beliefs and credences, it also doesn’t seem like knowledge always encodes 
uncertainty. One can know that p is flat-out true. This seems difficult to explain if the attitude 
involved in knowledge always encodes uncertainty. For these reasons, even though probability-
beliefs can constitute knowledge, this doesn’t seem like a satisfactory reason to reject this role for 
belief.  
 
Second, Staffel considers the idea, proposed by Buchak (2014), that beliefs are necessary as a basis 
for moral judgment. High credences can be based on statistical evidence, but we shouldn’t praise 
or blame someone based on statistical evidence. For example, Buchak provides a case in which 
you know either Barbara or Jake stole your cell phone, and you know men are 10x more likely to 
steal cell phones than women. You shouldn’t believe Jake did it or blame Jake for theft, even 
though you should have a high credence he’s a thief (Buchak 2014: 292). 
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Staffel is sympathetic to Buchak’s claim that mere statistical evidence is not a basis for rational 
belief, and that we ought not blame someone based on mere statistical evidence. However, Staffel 
considers a case where we have high credence based on non-statistical evidence that someone 
transgressed. In this case, Staffel says it is unclear that the credence cannot play a role in holding 
her responsible. If credence can underlie moral judgment, “why is outright belief needed as a 
middleman?” (p. 184). Staffel further notes that legally, in civil cases, the preponderance of 
evidence standard applies, on which someone can be convinced if the evidence makes it more than 
50% likely that they are guilty, and the evidence is not purely statistical. This further supports 
Staffel’s contention that high credence based on the right kind of evidence can play a role in blame, even 
if high credence based on mere statistical evidence cannot (p. 184). 
 
While Staffel’s objection is thought-provoking, there are responses available to Buchak. Buchak 
might simply disagree with Staffel’s contention that high credence based on the right kind of evidence 
can underlie moral judgment, as Buchak suggests that mere credence is always insufficient for 
blame. We take a stand on whether someone is guilty, then blame them in proportion to the 
severity of their wrongdoing. In our blaming behaviors, we do not (and should not) appeal to our 
credences that the offender is guilty, whether our credence is based on statistical evidence or not. 
 
This blame-requires-belief view seems to offer a simpler explanation of the data, as opposed to 
the view on which blame requires (i) a high credence, and that credence’s being based on both (ii) 
the right kind and (iii) an adequate degree of evidence. On Buchak’s view, every time we rightfully 
blame someone, we believe they are guilty. Staffel’s alternative view on which some, but not all, 
high credences play a role in blaming, begins to look complex and even potentially ad hoc. 
Therefore, Buchak’s view provides a clean, unified explanation of the data: beliefs are the states 
that enable us to rightfully blame. 
 
Finally, concerning Staffel’s point on the preponderance of evidence standard, it may be that 
sometimes moral and legal norms come apart. We might have a practical reason (e.g. deterrence) 
to use the preponderance of evidence standard in court, but that doesn’t mean we ought to blame 
someone just because our credence in their guilt is slightly above 0.5 (and based on non-statistical 
evidence).  
 
Generally, then, I’m not convinced that we should rule out these alternative roles for belief. 
Furthermore, the claim that beliefs only simplify reasoning leads to its own “Bayesian challenge” 
involving belief and acceptance. Namely: why posit beliefs in these cases, when it seems like 
acceptances can do all the relevant work? One accepts p iff one acts as if p is true. Belief is a mental 
state, primarily sensitive to epistemic factors. Acceptance is a policy, motivated by practical factors. 
But in the cases that motivate the simplifying role of belief, one treats a proposition p as it if has 
probability 1 for practical, rather than epistemic reasons. One's evidence doesn’t establish p to 
probability 1, but one treats p as if it has probability 1 to make their reasoning easier. This looks 
much more like acceptance than belief; it’s not clear that we have a reason to posit an additional 
mental state.  
 
Staffel addresses this worry in footnote 5, and suggests that acceptances are more voluntary than 
beliefs. However, there are some recent, compelling arguments that beliefs are sometimes under 
our voluntary control (see Roeber 2020). Furthermore, it does seem like what possibilities we 
consider in decision-making is something we can control, especially since reasoning is an active 
and deliberate process. A second potential response is that beliefs rule out small error possibilities, 
whereas acceptance can justify rounding up to 1 in cases where the error possibilities are much 
larger. I agree that acceptance can sometimes justify rounding p up to 1, even if the probability of 
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p on your evidence is quite low (see the cases in Jackson forthcoming). However, if one uses this 
method to distinguish belief from acceptance, this raises the question: how much can we “round 
up” and the attitude to still count as a belief? Can we round up to belief from 0.6 credence? A 0.5 
credence? The answer seems to depend on what’s at stake, but this is exactly what we’d expect if 
all of these roundings were acceptances—a practical policy—rather than beliefs—an epistemic 
attitude. 
 
This may push us, especially those of us inclined to belief-credence dualism, to think that the main 
function of belief isn’t simplification. In addition to playing a role in knowledge and playing a role 
in our moral judgments, other dualists, including Ross and Schroeder (2014) and Buchak 
(forthcoming) have suggested that beliefs play a related cluster of additional roles: allowing us to 
take a stand, have a view of the world, and represent the world such that certain claims are true. 
It’s not clear that credences can play this role, since sometimes we take a stand on uncertain claims. 
Buchak (forthcoming) argues that this provides a novel view in the epistemology of disagreement. 
If we conciliate with our credences, but remain steadfast in our beliefs, we can take a stand on the 
truth of certain claims—especially significant moral, political, or religious matters—but lower our 
credences as we encounter counterevidence. Our credences, then, function to track our precise 
level of evidential support for a claim, and help determine when we should give up a belief. At the 
same time, beliefs allow us to take a stand on our central life commitments, even in the face of 
counterevidence.  
 
This discussion raises the question: how do these roles of belief fit together? If beliefs allow us to 
take a stand, underlie our moral judgment, and play a role in knowledge, this suggests that we 
would have beliefs even if we did not have cognitive limitations. However, if beliefs only simplify 
reasoning, ideal reasoners might not have beliefs (at least it is unclear what role beliefs would play; 
they’d appear superfluous). Thus, there may a tension between these roles of belief: on the 
simplifying view, it is very natural to think that beliefs are a product of our cognitive limitations, 
but on the other views, the reason we have beliefs is not due to our limitations, so ideal reasoners 
would have beliefs. 
 
One possible response to this tension is to embrace one role for belief but not another. Staffel 
may be sympathetic to the view that the only (or at least primary) role of belief is simplifying 
reasoning. A second option is to say that beliefs play one or several of the other roles—taking a 
stand, being necessary for knowledge, underlying moral judgments—but to deny that beliefs play 
a simplifying role in our reasoning. On this view, it’s natural to think that acceptances, but not 
beliefs, play the simplifying role that Staffel describes. A third option is to embrace all the potential 
roles for belief. Maybe some of our beliefs play the role of simplifying reasoning, and other beliefs 
underlie moral judgments or enable us to take a stand. Maybe some beliefs even play both roles. 
On this third option, ideal reasoners might have some beliefs, but may have less beliefs that 
ordinary human thinkers. These possibilities all merit further exploration. 
 
All of this to say, chapter 9 nonetheless makes a lot of interesting moves, especially on the 
assumption that beliefs simplifying reasoning. And if beliefs (or acceptances) simplify reasoning, 




This book covers a lot of ground and opens up many fruitful areas of further research. Chapter 
10 is especially helpful in this regard, as it outlines the main themes of each chapter and where 
those themes might be further explored. I highly recommend this book to a large array of people, 
including those working on rationality, especially bounded rationality and degrees of rationality, 
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those working on norms for credences, those working on Dutch book and accuracy justifications 
for probabilism, those working on diachronic rationality (especially ch. 7), and those working on 
belief and credence (especially ch. 9). The book will also be of interest to those exploring questions 
about irrationality, especially questions about what attitudes irrational agents should have and how 
one should reason from irrational starting points. Finally, those interested in empirical questions 
regarding Bayesianism, e.g., how we succeed and fail to approximate Bayesian rationality according 
to cognitive science, should read this book.  
 
 
Acknowledgments: Thanks to Julia Staffel and Lara Buchak for helpful discussion about the 
content of this review.  
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